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Abstract
Ring signature is a kind of group-oriented signature. It allows a
member of a group to sign messages on behalf of the group without
revealing his/her identity. Certificateless public key cryptography was
first introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson in Asiacrypt 2003. In
certificateless cryptography, it does not require the use of certificates
to guarantee the authenticity of users’ public keys. Meanwhile, cer-
tificateless cryptography does not have the key escrow problem, which
seems to be inherent in the Identity-based cryptography. In this paper,
we propose a concrete certificateless ring signature scheme. The secu-
rity models of certificateless ring signature are also formalized. Our
new scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model, with the
assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.
In addition, we also show that a generic construction of certificateless
ring signature is insecure against the key replacement attack defined
in our security models.
1 Introduction
In Asiacrypt 2001, Rivest, Shamir and Tauman [22] introduced the concept
of ring signature, which makes it possible to specify a set of possible sign-
ers without revealing which member actually produced the signature. As
pointed in [22], ring signatures provide an elegant way to leak authoritative
secrets in an anonymous way, to sign casual email in a special way that can
∗ The main part of this work is published in [34].
† Email: leizhang@sei.ecnu.edu.cn
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only be verified by its intended recipient, anonymous membership authen-
tication for ad hoc groups [5], etc. In addition, ring signatures can also be
served as the building block of concurrent signatures and solve some other
problems in multiparty computations.
Ring signatures can be regarded as the simplified group signatures that
have only users and no managers. Group signatures are useful in the situa-
tion where the members want to cooperate, while ring signatures are useful
when the members do not want to cooperate. Both group signatures and
ring signatures are signer-ambiguous. However, group signatures have the
additional feature that the anonymity of a signer can be revoked (i.e., the
signer can be traced) by a designated group manager. Ring signatures allow
greater flexibility: no centralized group manager or coordination among the
various users is required (indeed, users may be unaware of each other at
the time they generate their public keys); rings may be formed completely
in an ad-hoc manner, do not require any coordination among the various
users (indeed, users do not even need to be aware of each other) and full
anonymity (unless the actual signer decides to expose himself). To produce
a ring signature, the actual signer declares an arbitrary set of possible signers
that must include himself, and computes the signature entirely by himself
using only his private key and the others’ public keys.
In traditional public key cryptosystem (PKC), each user U has a pair of
cryptographic keys–a public key and a private key. The private key is kept
secret by the user himself, while the public key may be widely distributed.
Anyone can encrypt messages with U ’s public key and obtain the ciphertexts
which can only be decrypted with U ’s private key. Similarly, one can use
U ’s public key to verify if a signature is generated by U . Therefore, there
is no need for the sender and receiver to share secret information before the
communication. The biggest challenge in PKC is ensuring the authenticity
of public key, that is how to bind a user and his public key. Suppose Alice
wants to encrypt a message to send to Bob, and Bob is someone who Al-
ice does not know personally, how can Alice be sure that Bob’s purported
public key really is Bob’s key (and not Charlie’s, for example). If Alice
uses a “false” public key to encrypt the message and send the ciphertext
to Bob, it will result that the intended receiver Bob can not obtain the
message, and even worse, someone else can decrypt the ciphertext and read
the message. The usual approach to solve this problem is to use a public
key infrastructure (PKI), in which one or more third parties, known as cer-
tificate authorities, issue certificates to bind a user and his public key. In
traditional PKC, one must first check the authenticity of the pair (U,PK)
by verifying the validity of its certificate before any operation regarding the
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user U . History has shown that certificates in traditional PKC are generally
considered to be costly to use and manage. It is even more problematic for a
ring signature scheme in traditional PKC, where the signer must first verify
all the certificates of group members before generating the ring signature
on behalf of that group, otherwise his anonymity is jeopardized under the
extreme case that all other ring members’ certificates are indeed invalid.
Given a ring signature, the verifier must perform the same verification as
well before checking the validity of the ring signature. This will lead to the
inefficiency of the whole scheme because the computation cost will increase
linearly with the group size.
In 1984, Shamir [23] first proposed the Identity-Based public key cryp-
tography (ID-PKC), in which the public key of a user is some unique public
information about the identity of the user (e.g. a user’s email address)
[9, 17]. Therefore, the need of certification can be eliminated. A Trusted
Third Party, called the Private Key Generator (PKG), generates the corre-
sponding private keys for the users in ID-PKC. To operate, the PKG first
publishes a “master” public key, and keeps the corresponding master private
key as secret. Given the master public key, any party can compute a public
key corresponding to an identity ID by combining the master public key
with the identity value. To obtain a corresponding private key, the party
authorized to use the identity ID contacts the PKG, which uses the mas-
ter private key to generate the private key for the identity ID. However,
this approach creates a new inherent problem, namely the key escrow of a
user’s private key, since PKG must be completely trusted. This is due to
the knowledge of the PKG on the user’s private key. For a ring signature
scheme in ID-PKC, a malicious PKG can forge a ring signature on behalf of
any group without being detected.
In order to enjoy the implicit certification property of ID-PKC while
without suffering from its inherent key escrow problem, Al-Riyami and Pa-
terson [2] proposed a new paradigm called certificateless public key cryp-
tography (CL-PKC). Different from ID-PKC, a third party which we call
Key Generation Center (KGC) in CL-PKC does not have the access to a
user’s private key. Instead, the KGC supplies a user with a partial pri-
vate key, which derives from the user’s identity. Then the user combines
the partial private key with some secret information chosen by himself to
generate his actual private key. The corresponding public key is computed
from the system’s public parameters and the secret information chosen by
the user, which is finally published in the system. Hence, it is no longer an
identity-based cryptography, since the public key needs to be provided (but
in contrast to the traditional public key cryptography, the public key does
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not require any certificate).
Due to the lack of certification in CL-PKC, it is conceivable that the
adversary can replace anyone’s public key of his choice. This key replacement
attack is also called Type I adversary in [2]. Obviously, a secure signature
signature scheme in CL-PKC must has the property that it is infeasible for
Type I adversary to create a valid signature under the false public key chosen
by the adversary himself. An assumption that must be made is that KGC
does not mount a public key replacement attack to a target user since he is
armed with this user’s partial private key. However, KGC might engage in
other adversarial activities: eavesdropping on signatures and making signing
queries, which is also known as Type II Adversary. In this way, the level of
trust is similar to the trust in a CA in a traditional PKI.
1.1 Motivations
Certificateless cryptography have some advantages over traditional PKC and
ID-PKC in some aspects [28, 29]. As a useful primitive, ring signatures have
been studied in traditional PKC and ID-PKC for more than five years. Even
in a theoretic point of view, ring signatures should be studied in CL-PKC
to rich the theories and techniques of CL-PKC. In practice, to generate a
ring signature on behalf of a group in traditional PKC, the signer must first
verify all the certificates of the group members, otherwise his anonymity is
jeopardized and the ring signature will be rejected if he uses invalid cer-
tificates of some group members. Given a ring signature, the verifier must
perform the same verification as well before checking the validity of the ring
signature. These verifications inevitably lead to the inefficiency of the whole
scheme since the computational cost increases linearly with the group size.
Although Identity-based ring signatures eliminate such costly verifications,
they suffer from a security drawback induced by the inherent key escrow
problem of ID-PKC. Namely, a malicious PKG can always issue valid ring
signatures on behalf of any group. As CL-PKC does not use public key
certificates, and in the meantime, it removes the key escrow problem of
ID-PKC, we think it supplies an appropriate environment for implementing
ring signatures. So it is necessary to extend the notion and security model
of ring signatures to CL-PKC. Compared with ring signature schemes in
traditional PKC, in a CL-Ring scheme, both the signer and the verifier can
avoid the costly verification of group members’ certificates. On the other
hand, in contrast to ID-based ring signatures, the KGC can no longer forge
a ring signature on behalf of a group without being detected.
In application aspects, like ring signatures in traditional PKC and ID-
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PKC, certificateless ring signatures can also be used in leaking authoritative
secrets in an anonymous way, anonymous membership authentication for
ad hoc groups [5], reports to the authorities embezzlement and corruption,
certificateless designated signatures and concurrent signatures, etc.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we introduce the notion of ring signature into certificateless
cryptography and propose a concrete certificateless ring signature scheme.
Firstly, we provide the security models of certificateless ring signatures.
Two types of adversaries: Type I adversary AI and Type II adversary AII
have been formally defined. The above two adversaries in our definition are
“super adversaries” [33]. That is, the adversary can get valid ring signatures
of the group whose public keys have been replaced, without supplying the
secret values that are used to generate those public keys. In addition, our
models also capture the group-changing attack [18] in the notion of ring
signatures.
Secondly, we give an analysis of a “seem-secure” generic construction
of certificateless ring signatures. The generic construction of certificateless
signatures was first proposed by Yum and Lee [26], which has been shown
insecure in [14]. Hu et al. also presented a secure construction of certifi-
cateless signatures [14]. Using the similar methods in [14], one can also get
a generic construction of certificateless ring signatures. However, as we will
show later, the resulting generic construction of certificateless ring signatures
is totally insecure against the key replacement attack.
Lastly, we present a concrete construction of certificateless ring signa-
tures. The new scheme uses the bilinear pairing on elliptic curves and con-
cretely, the signing phase requires 2 pairings and the verification requires 3
pairings. We prove its security in the random oracles, with the assumption
that Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable.
Organization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review
some preliminaries which are required in this paper. Section 4 defines the
security models in the notion of certificateless ring signatures. We analyze a
generic construction of certificateless ring signatures and show its insecurity
in Section 5. The concrete construction of certificateless ring signature is
proposed in Section 6. Its security proofs are given in Section 7. Finally,
Section 8 comes our conclusion.
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2 Related Work
Following the prior work of Rivest, Shamir and Tauman [22], a number of
constructions of ring signature in traditional PKC and ID-PKC have been
presented. Abe, Ohkubo, and Suzuki [1] provided a construction applica-
ble for several categories of public keys (e.g., integer factoring based and
discrete-log based). A simple ring signature using bilinear maps was given
in [4]. Herranz and Saez [12] generalized the forking lemma to the ring signa-
tures. In [27], Zhang and Kim extended the concept to Identity-Based ring
signature (IDRS) schemes. Some ring signature schemes with constant-size
were also presented in [10, 21].
In terms of security models for provably secure ring signature schemes,
there are three models commonly used. They provide different security
levels. The first and the weakest model was introduced by Rivest et al.
[22]. Later Abe et al. [1] proposed a very strong model. Finally, Liu and
Wong [18] presented a model whose security level is considered to be lying in
between the two foregoing models. We mainly use the ideas of constructing
IDRS schemes in [13], and the security models of ring signatures in [18] in
this paper.
CL-PKC has got fruitful achievements since its introduction in [2, 6, 7,
11, 25, 30, 31]. Al-Riyami and Paterson presented [2] the first certificateless
signature (CLS) scheme. Since then, several CLS schemes [14, 16, 19, 20, 24,
26, 32, 35] were proposed. In [15], Huang et al. defined the security model
of CLS schemes. Zhang et al. [35] improved the security model of CLS
schemes, and presented a secure CLS scheme. Generic ways to construct
CLS schemes were investigated in [26], [14]. In [16], a certificateless proxy
signature scheme was proposed. An work about certificateless ring signature
was done by Chow and Yap [8]. The security of their scheme is based on
the hardness of the k-CAA problem and Modified Inverse Computational
Diffie-Hellman problem and is proved in a weak model that requires a type
I adversary to submit the secret values corresponding to the replaced public
keys to the challenger in the sign queries. The computional cost of their
scheme involves a large amount of paring operations which linearly increase
with the number of group members.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we will review some fundamental backgrounds required in
this paper.
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3.1 Bilinear Pairings and Computational Problems
Let G1 be an additive group of prime order q and G2 be a multiplicative
group of the same order. Let P denote a generator of G1. A mapping
e : G1 × G1 −→ G2 is called a bilinear mapping if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Z
∗
q .
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1.
3. Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q)
for any P,Q ∈ G1.
For a group G of prime order, we denote the set G∗ = G \ {O}, where
O is the identity element of the group.
Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem: Given a generator P of a cyclic
additive group G with order q, and Q ∈ G∗ to find an integer a ∈ Z∗q such
that Q = aP .
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem: Given a generator
P of a cyclic additive group G with order q, and given (aP, bP ) for unknown
a, b ∈ Z∗q ; to compute abP .
3.2 The Concept of Certificateless Ring Signature Schemes
A CL-Ring scheme is defined by seven algorithms: Setup, Partial-Private-
Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, Ring-Sign and
Verify. The description of each algorithm is as follows.
• Setup: This algorithm runs by the KGC that takes as input a security
parameter ℓ to produce a masterkey and a list of system parameters
param.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm runs by the KGC that takes
as input a user’s identity ID, a parameter list param and a masterkey
to produce the user’s partial private key DID.
• Set-Secret-Value: This algorithm takes as input a parameter list param
and a user’s identity ID to produce the user’s secret value x.
• Set-Private-Key: This algorithm takes as input a parameter list param,
a user’s identity ID, the user’s partial private key DID and secret
value x to produce a private signing key SID for this user.
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• Set-Public-Key: This algorithm takes as input a parameter list param,
a user’s identity ID and secret value xID to produce a public key PID
for the user.
• Ring-Sign: This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ M,M is the
message space, a set of n group members whose identities form the
set LID = {ID1, ..., IDn} and their corresponding public keys form
the set LPK = {PID1 , ..., PIDn}, a parameter list param and a singer’s
signing key SIDs to produce a ring signature σ. Here SIDs is the s-th
group member’s private key.
• Verify: This algorithm takes as input a message M , a ring signature σ,
a parameter list param, the set LID of the group members’ identities
and the set LPK of the corresponding public keys of the group members
to output True if the signature is correct, or False otherwise.
4 Security Models of Certificateless Ring Signa-
ture Schemes
There are two types of adversaries in the certificateless system: namely
Type I Adversary and Type II Adversary. A Type I Adversary AI simulates
attacks when the adversary (anyone except the KGC) replaces the user’s
public key with a value of his/her choice. However, AI is not given this user’s
partial private key DID (and system’s masterkey). On the other hand, a Type
II Adversary AII has access to the masterkey but cannot perform public key
replacement.
Combining the security notions of certificateless public key cryptography
and traditional ring signature schemes, we define the security of a CL-Ring
scheme via the following two games between a challenger C and an adversary
AI or AII .
Game 1: Unforgeability of CL-Ring against Type I Adversary AI
Setup: C runs the Setup algorithm, takes as input a security parameter ℓ to
obtain a masterkey and the system parameter param. C then sends param to
the adversary AI while keeping the masterkey as secret. In addition, C will
maintain three lists L1, L2, L3 where
• L1 is used to record the identities which have been chosen by AI in
the Partial-Private-Key Queries.
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• L2 is used to record the identities whose public keys have been replaced
by AI .
• L3 is used to record the identities which have been chosen by AI in
the Private-Key Queries.
All these three lists L1, L2, L3 are the empty set ∅ at the beginning of the
game.
Training : The adversary AI can adaptively issue a polynomially bounded
number of queries as defined below:
• Partial-Private-Key Queries PPK(ID): AI can request the partial pri-
vate key of any user whose identity is ID. In respond,
1. C first resets L1 = L1 ∪ {ID}.
2. C then runs the algorithm Partial-Private-Key-Extract and outputs
the partial private key DID.
• Public-Key Queries PK(ID): AI can request the public key of a user
whose identity is ID. In respond,
1. C first runs the algorithm Set-Secret-Value and obtains the secret
value xID.
2. C then runs the algorithm Set-Public-Key and obtains the public
key PID. C outputs the public key PID as the answer.
• Public-Key-Replacement Queries PKR(ID,P ′ID): For any user whose
identity is ID, AI can choose a new public key P
′
ID. AI then sets
P ′ID as the new public key of this user and submits (ID,P
′
ID) to C.
On receiving a query PKR(ID,P ′ID), C resets L2 = L2 ∪ {ID} and
updates the public key of this user to the new value P ′ID.
• Private-Key Queries PrK(ID): AI can request the private key of a
user whose identity is ID. In respond,
1. C first checks the set L2. If ID ∈ L2 (that is, the public key
of the user ID has been replaced), C will return the symbol ⊥
which means C cannot output the private key of an identity whose
public key has been replaced.
2. Otherwise, ID /∈ L2 and C resets L3 = L3 ∪ {ID}. C then runs
the algorithm Set-Private-Key and outputs the private key SID.
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• Ring-Sign Queries RS(M,LID, LPK): AI can request the ring signa-
ture of a message M on behalf of a group whose identities are listed in
the set LID and the corresponding public keys are in the set LPK .
In respond, C outputs a ring signature σ for the message M . It
is required that the algorithm Verify will output True for the input
(M,σ, param, LID, LPK).
Forgery : Finally, AI outputs a tuple (M
∗, σ∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK) as the forgery. We
say AI wins the game if the forgery satisfies all the following requirements:
1. The algorithm Verify outputs True for the input (M∗, σ∗, param, L∗ID, L
∗
PK).
2. L∗ID ∩ L1 ∩ L2 = ∅ and L
∗
ID ∩ L3 = ∅.
3. (M∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK) has never been queried during the Ring-Sign Queries.
Game 2: Unforgeability of CL-Ring against Type II Adversary
AII
Setup: C runs the Setup algorithm, takes as input a security parameter ℓ to
obtain the system parameter list param and also the system’s masterkey. C
then sends param and masterkey to the adversary AII . C will maintain two
lists L1, L2 where
• L1 is used to record the identities whose public keys have been replaced
by AII .
• L2 is used to record the identities which have been chosen by AII in
the Private-Key Queries.
Both two lists L1, L2 are empty at the beginning of the game.
Training : As defined in Game 1, the type II adversary AII can issue a
polynomially bounded number of Public Key Queries, Private-Key Queries,
Public-Key-Replacement Queries and Ring-Sign Queries. C will answer those
queries as same in Game 1. Note that AII does not need to issue Partial-
Private-Key queries because he has already known the system’s masterkey.
Forgery : Finally, AII outputs a tuple (M
∗, σ∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK) as the forgery. We
say AII wins the game if the forgery satisfies all the following requirements:
1. The algorithm Verify outputs True for the input (M∗, σ∗, param, L∗ID, L
∗
PK).
2. L∗ID ∩ L1 = ∅ and L
∗
ID ∩ L2 = ∅.
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3. (M∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK) has never been queried during the Ring-Sign Queries.
Definition 4.1 A CL-Ring scheme is existentially unforgeable under adap-
tively chosen-message attack iff the success probability of any polynomially
bounded adversary in the above two games is negligible.
Definition 4.2 A CL-Ring scheme is said to have the unconditional signer
anonymity if for any group of n users whose identities form the set LID and
their corresponding public keys form the set LPK , any message M and any
ring signature σ =Ring-Sign(M,LID, LPK , SIDs), any verifier V cannot
identify the actual signer with probability better than a random guess. That
is, V can only output the actual signer with probability no better than 1
n
( 1
n−1
when V is in the signers’ ring).
5 Analysis of A Generic Construction of CL-Ring
In [26], Yum and Lee presented a generic way to construct a certificateless
signature scheme. However, Hu et al. [14] pointed out that their construc-
tion is flawed and proposed a new one. It seems at first glance that the
methods in [14] can also be used to obtain a generic construction of CL-
Ring signatures. However, as we will show later, the resulting scheme is not
secure in our security model defined in Section 4.
5.1 A Generic Construction of CL-Ring
Let
∏
PK = (GenPK , Ring-SignPK , V erPK) be a traditional public key-
based ring signature scheme which is existentially unforgeable under adap-
tively chosen-message attack. GenPK takes a security parameter as input
and generates a public/secret pair (pkPK , skPK); Ring-SignPK takes a pri-
vate signing key, a set of public keys and a message as inputs, and generates
a ring signature σPK ; and V erPK is the corresponding ring signature veri-
fication algorithm.
Let
∏
ID = (GenID,KGenID, Ring-SignID, V erID) be an identity-based
ring signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable under adaptively
chosen-message and identities attacks. GenID takes a security parameter
as input and generates a master secret key masterkey and a list of system
parameters param; KGenID is an identity-based secret key generation algo-
rithm which takes masterkey and an identity ID and generates a secret key
denoted by DID; Ring-SignID takes a private signing key, a set of identi-
ties and a message as inputs, and generates an identity-based ring signature
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denoted by σID; and V erID is the corresponding ring signature verification
algorithm.
As defined in Section 4, a CL-Ring signature scheme consists of seven
algorithms. Using the similar methods in [14], we can obtain a generic
construction of CL-Ring as described in Fig 1.
5.2 Security Analysis of the Generic Construction
In this section, we will show that the generic construction described in Fig 1
is not secure under the definition in Section 4.
We firstly show that a type I adversaryAI can forge a valid ring signature
of any message M . The attack algorithm is described as below:
• AI first chooses n identities (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn) and sets
LID = {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn}.
• As defined in the Game 1 in Section 4, AI then issues n Public-Key
queries to obtain the corresponding public keys (PID1 , PID2 , · · · , PIDn).
• AI runs the algorithm Set-Secret-Value to generate a secret value xIDi
for the user IDi ∈ LID. It also runs the algorithm Set-Public-Key to
obtain a public key P ′IDi . Finally, it replaces IDi’s public key with
P ′IDi and sets
LPK = {PID1 , PID2 , · · · , P
′
IDi
, · · · , PIDn}.
• AI then submits a partial private key query for an identity IDj ∈ LID
and obtains the partial private key DIDj , with the only requirement
that IDj 6= IDi.
• For any message M , AI sets M
′ = M ||param||LID||LPK and uses
xIDi to compute
σPK = Ring−SignPK(xIDi , LPK ,M
′).
• It then sets M ′′ =M ||param||LID||LPK ||σPK and uses DIDj to com-
pute
σID = Ring−SignID(DIDj , LID,M
′′)
• AI outputs (M,σ = σPK ||σID, LID, LPK) as the forgery.
12
Figure 1: A Generic Construction of CL-Ring
Setup: On input 1ℓ, the KGC runs GenID(1
ℓ) to produce a masterkey and
a list of system parameters param.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm accepts param,
masterkey, a user’s identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and runs
KGenID(param,masterkey, ID) to output the user’s partial
private key DID.
Set-Secret-Value: This algorithm accepts param, a user’s identity ID and
runs GenPK(1
ℓ) to generate a public/secret (PID, xID) pair and re-
turns xID as user’s secret value .
Set-Private-Key: This algorithm takes as input a parameter list param, a
user’s identity ID, the user’s partial private key DID and secret value
xID to produce a private signing key SID = (xID,DID) for this user.
Set-Public-Key: This algorithm takes as input a parameter list param, a
user’s identity ID, (PID, xID) and outputs public key PID for the
user.
Ring-Sign: This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ M, a
set of n group members whose identities form the set LID =
{ID1, ..., IDn} and their corresponding public keys form the set
LPK = {PID1 , ..., PIDn}, a parameter list param and a singer’s signing
key SIDs = (xIDs ,DIDs). Here xIDs and DIDs is the s-th group mem-
ber’s secret value and partial private key respectively. To generate a
ring signature σ, the signer does the following.
• Set M ′ =M ||param||LID||LPK ;
• Compute σPK = Ring-SignPK(xIDs , LPK ,M
′);
• Set M ′′ =M ||param||LID||LPK ||σPK ;
• Compute σID = Ring-SignID(DIDs , LID,M
′′);
• Set σ = σPK ||σID.
Verify: If V erPK(σPK , LPK ,M
′) = True and V erID(σID, LID,M
′′) =
True then the algorithm outputs True, otherwise outputs False.
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As we can see, σ is a valid ring signature of M under LID and LPK. This
is because AI runs all the algorithms as same as defined in the generic
construction in Section 4. We note that this attack is a strong attack that
belongs to the no-message attack classes, where no signing oracle is required.
The generic construction given in Section 4 only guarantees that the
singer of a valid ring signature possesses a secret value xIDi of a user IDi ∈
LID and a partial private key DIDj of a user IDj ∈ LID, instead of proving
that the signer must know the private key of one user (i.e., IDi = IDj).
This is the reason why a Type I adversary can forge a valid signature for any
message. How to give a provably secure generic construction of certificateless
ring signature is still an open problem.
6 A Concrete Certificateless Ring Signatures Scheme
In this section, we will give the concrete construction of certificateless ring
signature.
6.1 Description of Our CL-Ring Scheme
Our CL-Ring scheme consists of the following concrete algorithms:
• Setup: Given a security parameter ℓ, the algorithm works as follows.
1. Specify G1, G2, e, as described in Section 3.1.
2. Arbitrarily choose a generator P ∈ G1 and set g = e(P,P ).
3. Choose a random masterkey κ ∈ Z∗q and set P0 = κP .
4. Choose cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}
∗ −→ G1, H2 :
{0, 1}∗ −→ Z∗q and H3 : {0, 1}
∗ −→ G1.
The system parameters param=(G1, G2, e, P, g, P0,H1,H2,H3). The
message space is M= {0, 1}∗.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm accepts param, masterkey
and a user’s identity IDi ∈ {0, 1}
∗ to output the user’s partial private
key Di = κQi. Where Qi = H1(IDi).
• Set-Secret-Value: Given param, this algorithm selects a random xi ∈ Z
∗
q
as the user’s (whose identity is IDi) secret value.
• Set-Private-Key: This algorithm takes as input param, a user’s identity
IDi, the user’s partial private key Di and the user’s secret value xi ∈
Z∗q . The output of the algorithm is the user’s private key Si = (xi,Di).
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• Set-Public-Key: This algorithm accepts param, a user’s identity IDi
and his secret value xi ∈ Z
∗
q to produce the user’s public key Pi = xiP .
• Ring-Sign: Suppose there’s a group of n users whose identities form
the set LID = {ID1, ..., IDn}, and their corresponding public keys
form the set LPK = {P1, ..., Pn}. To sign a message M ∈ M on behalf
of the group, the actual signer, indexed by s using the private key
Ss = (xs,Ds), performs the following steps.
1. For each i ∈ {1, ..., n}\{s}, select ri ∈ Z
∗
q uniformly at random,
compute yi = g
ri .
2. Compute hi = H2(M ||LID||LPK ||yi) for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}\{s}.
3. Choose random rs ∈ Z
∗
q , compute U = H3(M ||LID||LPK), ys =
grse(−P0,
∑
i 6=s hiQi)e(−U,
∑
i 6=s hiPi). If ys = 1G2 or ys = yi
for some i 6= s, then redo this step.
4. Compute hs = H2(M ||LID||LPK ||ys).
5. Compute V = (
∑n
i=1 ri)P + hs(Ds + xsU).
6. Output the ring signature on M as σ = {(y1, ..., yn), V }.
• Verify: To verify a ring signature σ = {(y1, ..., yn), V } on a message
M with identities in LID and corresponding public keys in LPK , the
verifier performs the following steps.
1. Compute hi = H2(M ||LID||LPK ||yi) for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, com-
pute U = H3(M ||LID||LPK).
2. Verify e(V, P )
?
= y1 · ... · yne(
∑n
i=1 hiQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi, U) holds
with equality.
3. Accept the ring signature as valid and output True if the above
equation holds, otherwise, output False.
6.2 Efficiency
We only consider the costly operations including the pairing operation (Pair-
ing), scalar multiplication in G1 (G1 SM), exponentiation in G2 (G2 E) and
MapToPoint hash operation [31] (Hash). The numbers of these operations
in our scheme are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Efficiency
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Pairing G1 SM G2 E Hash
Sign 2 2n+3 n n+1
Verify 3 2n 0 n+1
Total 5 4n+3 n 2n+2
Pairing operation is the most time consuming operation. Our CL-Ring
scheme only requires 5 pairing operations which is independent of the group
size.
7 Analysis of the Proposed CL-Ring Scheme
In this section, we will analyze our proposed scheme in detail.
7.1 Correctness
The correctness of the proposed scheme can be easily verified with the fol-
lowing:
e(V, P ) = e((
n∑
i=1
ri)P + hs(Ds + xsU), P )
= e((
n∑
i=1
ri)P,P )e(hs(Ds + xsU), P )
= y1 · ... · yne(
∑
i 6=s
hiQi, P0)e(
∑
i 6=s
hiPi, U)e(hsDs, P )e(hsxsU,P )
= y1 · ... · yne(
∑
i 6=s
hiQi, P0)e(
∑
i 6=s
hiPi, U)e(hsQs, P0)e(hsPs, U)
= y1 · ... · yne(
n∑
i=1
hiQi, P0)e(
n∑
i=1
hiPi, U)
7.2 Unconditional Anonymity
Let σ = {(y1, ..., yn), V } be a valid ring signature of a message M on behalf
of a group of n members specified by identities in LID and public keys in
LPK . Since all the ri, i ∈ {0, ..., n}\{s} are randomly generated, hence all
yi, i ∈ {0, ..., n}\{s} are also uniformly distributed. The randomness of rs
chosen by the signer implies ys = g
rse(−P0,
∑
i 6=s hiQi)e(−U,
∑
i 6=s hiPi) is
also uniformly distributed. So (y1, ..., yn) in the signature reveals no infor-
mation about the signer.
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It remains to consider whether V = (
∑n
i=1 ri)P +hs(Ds+xsU) leaks in-
formation about the actual signer. From the construction of V , it is obvious
to see that Ds+xsU = h
−1
s (V −(
∑n
i=1 ri)P ). To identify whether IDs is the
identity of the actual signer, the only way is to check e(Qs, P0)e(Ps, U)
?
=
e(Ds +xsU,P ). Namely, e(Qs, P0)e(Ps, U)
?
= e(h−1s (V − (
∑n
i=1 ri)P ), P ). If
IDs is the identity of the actual signer, it should hold
ys = g
rse(−P0,
∑
i 6=s
hiQi)e(−U,
∑
i 6=s
hiPi).
It remains to check
e(Qs, P0)e(Ps, U)
?
= (
e(V, P )
y1 · ... · yne(P0,
∑
i 6=s hsQs)e(U,
∑
i 6=j hsPi)
)h
−1
s
However,we have for each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
(
e(V, P )
y1 · ... · yne(P0,
∑
i 6=j hiQi)e(U,
∑
i 6=j hiPi)
)h
−1
j
= (
e(
∑n
i=1 ri)P + hs(Ds + xsU), P )
y1 · ... · yne(P0,
∑
i 6=s hiQi)e(U,
∑
i 6=s hiPi)e(hsQs, P0)e(hsPs, U)w
)h
−1
j
= (
e((
∑n
i=1 ri)P,P )
e((
∑
i 6=s ri)P,P )yse(P0,
∑
i 6=s hiQi)e(U,
∑
i 6=s hiPi)w
)h
−1
j
= w−h
−1
j = e(Qj , P0)e(Pj , U)
where w = e(−hjQj, P0)e(−hjPj , U), and IDs is the identity of the actual
signer. This fact shows that V in the signature does not leak any informa-
tion about the identity of the actual signer. And hence, the unconditional
anonymity of our CL-Ring scheme is proved.
7.3 Unforgeability
Assuming that the CDH problem is hard, we now show the unforgeability
of our CL-Ring scheme.
Theorem 7.1 In the random oracle model [3], if AI can win the Game
1, with an advantage ǫ ≥ 7P
qH1
n /2ℓ within a time span t for a security
parameter ℓ; and asking at most qK Partial-Private-Key queries, at most
qP Public-Key queries, at most qPr Private-Key queries, at most qH1 H1
queries, at most qH2 H2 queries, at most qH3 H3 queries, qS Ring-Sign
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queries. Then the CDH problem in G1 can be solved within time 2(t +
qH1T1+qH2T2+qH3T3+qKTK+qPTP +qPrTPr+qSTS) and with probability
≥ (( qK+qPr
qK+qPr+n
)qK+qPr+n( n
qK+qPr+n
)nǫ)2/66P
qH1
n where n is the ring scale,
P
qH1
n is defined as the number of n-permutations of qH1 elements i.e. P
qH1
n =
qH1 · ... · (qH1 − n + 2) · (qn − n + 1), T1 (resp. T2, T3, TK , TP , TPr and TS)
is the time cost of an H1 (resp. H2,H3, Partial-Private-Key, Public-Key,
Private-Key and Ring-Sign) query.
Please refer to Appendix A.
Theorem 7.2 In the random oracle model, if AII can win the Game 2, with
an advantage ǫ ≥ 7P
qH1
n /2ℓ within a time span t for a security parameter ℓ;
and asking at most qP Public-Key queries, at most qK Private-Key queries,
at most qH1 H1 queries, at most qH2 H2 queries, at most qH3 H3 queries,
at most qS Ring-Sign queries. Then the CDH problem in G1 can be solved
within time 2(t+ qH1T1 + qH2T2 + qH3T3 + qKTPr + qPTP + qSTS) and with
probability ≥ (( qK
qK+n
)qK+n( n
qK+n
)nǫ)2/66P
qH1
n .
Please refer to Appendix B.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a concrete construction of certificateless ring
signature scheme from the bilinear pairing. The security models of certifi-
cateless ring signatures are also formalized. The models capture the essence
of the possible adversaries in the notion of certificateless system and ring
signatures. In the random oracle models, the unforgeability of our scheme is
based on the hardness of Computational Diffie-Hellman problem. We note
that the number of pairing computation in our scheme is constant and does
not grow with the number of group members.
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A Proof of Theorem 7.1
Proof. Let C be a CDH attacker, AI be a type I adversary of our CL-Ring
scheme who interacts with C following Game 1 and can forge a valid ring
signature. Suppose C receives a random instance (P, aP, bP ) of the CDH
problem in G1. We show how C can use AI to solve the CDH problem, i.e.
to compute abP .
Setup: C first sets P0 = aP and selects param=(G1, G2, e, P, g, P0,H1,H2,H3),
then sends param to AI . We take hash functions H1,H2 and H3 as random
oracles.
Training: AI can ask C H1,H2,H3, Partial-Private-Key, Public-Key, Private-
Key, Public-Key-Replacement and Ring-Sign queries. In order to maintain
consistency and avoid conflict, C keeps four listsH1, H2, H3, andK to store
the answers used, where H1 includes items of the form (ID,α,QID, c), H2
includes items of the form (M,LID, LPK , y, h),H3 includes items of the form
(M,LID, LPK , β, U, c
′′), andK includes items of the form (ID, x,DID, PID, c
′).
All of these four lists are initially empty. C also maintains three lists
L1, L2, L3, the function of these three lists are the same as mentioned in
Game 1 Section 4.
H1 Queries: On receiving a query H1(ID), C does as follows.
1. If there exists an item (ID,α,QID, c) in H1, then C returns QID as
answer.
2. Otherwise, C first flips a coin c ∈ {0, 1} that yields 0 with probability
δ and 1 with probability 1− δ (δ will be determined later), then picks
a random element α (has not been used before) in Z∗q . If c = 0,
C computes QID = H1(ID) = αP ; otherwise c = 1, it computes
QID = H1(ID) = αbP . C then adds (ID,α,QID, c) toH1 and returns
QID as answer.
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H2 Queries: On receiving a query H2(M ||LID||LPK ||y), C first checks if
there exists an item (M,LID, LPK , y, h) in H2, if so, returns h as an-
swer. Otherwise, C picks a random h ∈ Z∗q which has not been used in
the answers of the former H2 Queries, then returns h as answer and adds
(M,LID, LPK , y, h) to H2.
H3 Queries: On receiving a query H3(M ||LID||LPK), C first checks if there
exists an item (M,LID, LPK , β, U, c
′′) in H3, if so, returns U as answer.
Otherwise, C first flips a coin c′′ ∈ {0, 1} that yields 0 with probability δ and
1 with probability 1−δ then picks a random β ∈ Z∗q which has not been used
in the answers of the former H3 Queries. If c
′′ = 0, compute U = βP ; while
c′′ = 1, compute U = βbP . In both cases, C will add (M,LID, LPK , β, U, c
′′)
to H3 and return U as answer.
Partial-Private-Key Queries: Whenever C receives a query PPK(ID)
1. If there exists an item (ID, x,DID, PID, c
′) in K, C does the following:
(a) If DID 6= ⊥, C returns DID as answer.
(b) Else, if there’s an item (ID,α,QID, c) exists in H1, C sets L1 =
L1 ∪ {ID}, DID = αP0 and returns DID as answer when c = 0;
while c = 1, C aborts.
(c) Otherwise, C first makes an H1(ID) query to obtain an item
(ID,α,QID, c). If c = 1, C aborts; while c = 0, C sets L1 =
L1 ∪ {ID}, DID = αP0 and returns DID as answer.
2. Otherwise C does the following:
(a) If there exists an item (ID,α,QID, c) in H1, C sets L1 = L1 ∪
{ID}, computesDID = αP0, sets x = ⊥, PID = ⊥, adds (ID, x,DID, PID, c
′)
toK and returnsDID as answer when c = 0; while c = 1 C aborts.
(b) Otherwise, C first makes an H1(ID) query to obtain an item
(ID,α,QID, c) in H1, then proceeds as in (a).
Public-Key Queries: Whenever C receives a query PK(ID)
1. If there exists an item (ID, x,DID, PID, c
′) in K, C does the following:
(a) If PID 6= ⊥, C returns PID as answer;
(b) Otherwise, C first flips a coin c′ ∈ {0, 1} that yields 0 with
probability δ and 1 with probability 1 − δ, then picks a ran-
dom x ∈ Z∗q . If c
′ = 0, C sets PID = xP ; otherwise c = 1, it
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computes PID = xaP . C then updates (ID, x,DID, PID, c
′) with
new values and returns PID as answer.
2. Otherwise, C first flips a coin c′ ∈ {0, 1} that yields 0 with probability
δ and 1 with probability 1− δ, then picks a random x ∈ Z∗q . If c
′ = 0,
C sets PID = xP ; otherwise c = 1, it computes PID = xaP . C then
sets DID = ⊥, returns PID as answer and adds (ID, x,DID, PID, c
′)
to K.
Public-Key-Replacement Queries: On receiving a query PKR(ID,P ′ID) (C
sets L2 = L2 ∪ {ID}), C first makes a PPK(ID) query to obtain an item
(ID, x,DID, PID, c
′), then sets x = ⊥, PID = P
′
ID, and updates the item
(ID, x,DID, PID, c
′) in K to record this replacement.
Private-Key Queries: Whenever receives a query PrK(ID), if ID ∈ L2 C
returns ⊥, otherwise
1. When there exists an item (ID, x,DID, PID, c
′) in K
(a) If x = ⊥, C first makes a PK(ID) query. If c′ 6= 1, C sets
L3 = L3 ∪ {ID}, returns (x,DID) as answer; otherwise C aborts.
(b) Else if DID = ⊥, C first makes a PPK(ID) query, if C does not
abort and c′ 6= 1 then sets L3 = L3 ∪ {ID} and (x,DID) will be
returned as answer. Otherwise C aborts.
(c) Otherwise, when c′ = 1 C aborts, while c′ = 0 C sets L3 =
L3 ∪ {ID} and returns (x,DID) as answer.
2. Otherwise, C first makes PK(ID) and PPK(ID) queries. If C does
not abort and c′ 6= 1, then sets L3 = L3 ∪ {ID}, returns (x,DID) as
answer and adds (ID, x,DID, PID, c
′) to K; otherwise, C aborts.
Ring-Sign Queries: AI chooses a group of n users whose identities form the
set LID = {ID1, ..., IDn} and their corresponding public keys form the set
LPK = {P1, ..., Pn}, and may ask a ring signature on a message M of this
group. On receiving a Ring-Sign query RS(M,LID, LPK), C creates a ring
signature as follows:
1. Choose a random index s ∈ {1, ..., n}.
2. For all i ∈ {1, ..., n}\{s}, choose ri ∈ Z
∗
q uniformly at random, com-
pute yi = g
ri .
3. For all i ∈ {1, ..., n}\{s}, compute hi = H2(M ||LID||LPK ||yi).
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4. Choose hs ∈ Z
∗
q , V ∈ G1 at random.
5. Compute ys = e(V−(
∑
i 6=s ri)P,P )e(
∑n
i=1 hiQi,−P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi,−U)
(Where U = H3(M || LID||LPK), Qi = H1(IDi)). If ys = 1G2 or
ys = yi for some i 6= s, then goto step 4.
6. Set H2(M ||LID||LPK ||ys) = hs.
7. Return (M,LID, LPK , σ = {(y1, ..., yn), V }) as answer.
Forgery: Finally, AI outputs a tuple (M
∗, L∗ID = {ID
∗
1 , ..., ID
∗
n}, L
∗
PK =
{P ∗1 , ..., P
∗
n}, σ
∗ = {(y∗1 , ..., y
∗
n), V
∗}) which means σ∗ is a ring signature on
messageM∗ on behalf of the group specified by identities in L∗ID and the cor-
responding public keys in L∗PK . It is required that C does not know the pri-
vate key of any member in this group, L∗ID∩((L1∩L2)∪L3) = ∅ and the ring
signature σ∗ on messageM∗ on behalf of the group must be valid (Event 1).
Now, applying the ‘ring forking lemma’ [13], if AI succeeds in outputting
a valid ring signature σ∗ with probability ǫ ≥ 7P
qH1
n /2ℓ in a time span t
in the above interaction, then within time 2t and probability ≥ ǫ2/66P
qH1
n ,
C can get two valid ring signatures (M∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK , σ
∗ = {(y∗1 , ..., y
∗
n), V
∗})
and (M∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK , σ
′∗ = {(y∗1 , ..., y
∗
n), V
′∗}). From these two valid ring
signatures, C obtains
e(V ∗, P ) = y∗1 · ... · y
∗
ne(
n∑
i=1
h∗iP
∗
i , U
∗)e(
n∑
i=1
h∗iQ
∗
i , P0)
and
e(V ′∗, P ) = y∗1 · ... · y
∗
ne(
n∑
i=1
h′∗i P
∗
i , U
∗)e(
n∑
i=1
h′∗i Q
∗
i , P0)
Where U∗ = H3(M
∗||L∗ID||L
∗
PK), Q
∗
i = H1(ID
∗
i ), h
∗
i = H2(M
∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK , y
∗
i ),
h′∗i = H
′
2(M
∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK , y
∗
i ), and for some s ∈ {1, ..., n}, h
∗
s 6= h
′∗
s , while for
i ∈ {1, ..., n}\{s}, h∗i = h
′∗
i . From the above two equations we have
e(V ∗ − V ′∗, P ) = e((h∗s − h
′∗
s )P
∗
s , U
∗)e((h∗s − h
′∗
s )Q
∗
s, P0)
At this stage, C may find the item (M∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK , β
∗, U∗, c′′∗) from H3,
(ID∗s , α
∗
s, Q
∗
s, c
∗
s) from H1, (ID
∗
s , x
∗
s,D
∗
s , P
∗
s , c
′∗
s) from K. There are three
cases in which C can successfully solve the CDH problem.
• Case 1: c∗s = 1, c
′′∗ = 0, this means Q∗s = α
∗
sbP,U
∗ = β∗P . In this
case, e(V ∗ − V ′∗, P ) = e((h∗s − h
′∗
s )(β
∗P ∗s + α
∗
sabP ), P ). So, C can get
abP = α∗s
−1((h− h′)−1(V ∗ − V ′∗)− β∗P ∗s ).
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• Case 2: c′∗s = 1, c
′′∗ = 1, c∗s = 0, x
∗
s 6= ⊥, and P
∗
s = x
∗
saP,U
∗ =
β∗bP,Q∗s = α
∗
sP , C can get abP = (x
∗
sβ
∗)−1((h − h′)−1(V ∗ − V ′∗) −
α∗sP0).
• Case 3: c′∗s = 1, c
′′∗ = 1, c∗s = 1, x
∗
s 6= ⊥, and P
∗
s = x
∗
saP,U
∗ =
β∗bP,Q∗s = α
∗
sbP , C can get abP = (x
∗
sβ
∗+α∗s)
−1(h−h′)−1(V ∗−V ′∗)
(Note the probability that x∗sβ
∗ + α∗s = 0 is negligible).
Probability of Success: Now we determine the value of δ and consider the
probability for C to successfully solve the given CDH problem. The probabil-
ity that C does not abort in all the qK Partial-Private-Key Queries and qPr
Private-Key Queries is at least δqK+qPr . The probability that the forged
ring signature is helpful for C to solve the CDH problem is Pr[(Case1 ∨
Case2 ∨ Case3) ∧ Event 1]≤ (1 − δ)n. So the combined probability is
δqK+qPr(1−δ)n. We can find the value of δ that maximize this probability is
qK+qPr
qK+qPr+n
and the maximized probability is ( qK+qPr
qK+qPr+n
)qK+qPr( n
qK+qPr+n
)n.
Based on the bound from the ring forking lemma [13], if AI succeeds in
time ≤ t with probability ǫ ≥ 7P
qH1
n /2ℓ, then the CDH problem in G1 can be
solved by C within time 2(t+qH1T1+qH2T2+qH3T3+qKTK+qPTP+qPrTPr+
qSTS) and with probability ≥ ((
qK+qPr
qK+qPr+n
)qK+qPr · ( n
qK+qPr+n
)nǫ)2/66P
qH1
n .
B Proof of Theorem 7.2
Proof. Let AII be our type II adversary, C be a CDH attacker who receives
a random instance (P, aP, bP ) and has to compute the value of abP .
Setup: C generates the KGC’s masterkey κ ∈ Z∗q and system parameters
param=(G1, G2, e, P, g, P0, H1,H2,H3). When the simulation is started, AII
is provided with param and the masterkey κ.
Training: AII can ask C H1,H2,H3, Public-Key, Private-Key, and Ring-Sign
queries. Since AII has access to the masterkey κ, he can do Partial-Private-
Key-Extract himself. C also maintains four lists, namely H1 contains items
of the form (ID,QID), H2 contains items of the form (M,LID, LPK , y, h),
H3 contains items of the form (M,LID, LPK , β, U) and K contains items of
the form (ID, x, PID) to store the answers used. All of these four lists are
initially empty. C also maintains two lists L1, L2, the function of these two
lists are the same as mentioned in Game 2 Section 4.
H1 Queries: On receiving a query H1(ID). If (ID,QID) exists in H1 then
C returns QID as answer. Otherwise, C picks a random QID ∈ G
∗
1 which has
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not been used in the former H1 Queries, then returns QID as answer and
adds (ID,QID) to H1.
H2 Queries: On receiving a queryH2(M ||LID||LPK ||y), C first checks whether
there exists an item (M,LID, LPK , y, h) in H2, if so, returns h as answer.
Otherwise, C picks a random h ∈ Z∗q which has not been used in the former
H2 Queries, then returns h as answer and adds (M,LID, LPK , y, h) to H2.
H3 Queries: Whenever receives a query H3(M ||LID||LPK), C first checks
whether there exists an item (M,LID, LPK , β, U) in H3, if so, returns U as
answer. Otherwise, C picks a random β ∈ Z∗q which has not been used in
the former H3 Queries, computes U = βaP , then adds (M,LID, LPK , β, U)
to H3 and returns U as answer.
Public-Key Queries: On receiving a query PK(ID)
1. If there is an item (ID, x, PID, c) exists in K, then C returns PID as
answer.
2. Otherwise, C first flips a coin c ∈ {0, 1} that yields 0 with probability
δ and 1 with probability 1− δ, then picks a random x ∈ Z∗q . If c = 0,
C sets PID = xP , returns PID as answer and adds (ID, x, PID, c) to
K. Else c = 1, C sets PID = xbP , returns PID as answer and adds
(ID, x, PID, c) to K.
Public-Key-Replacement Queries: On receiving a query PKR(ID,P ′ID) (C
sets L1 = L1 ∪ {ID}), C first makes a PPK(ID) query to obtain an
item (ID, x, PID , c), then sets x = ⊥, PID = P
′
ID, and updates the item
(ID, x, PID, c) in K to record this replacement.
Private-Key Queries: On receiving a query PrK(ID), if ID ∈ L1 C returns
⊥, otherwise
1. If there is an item (ID, x, PID, c) in K, when c = 0 C sets L2 =
L2 ∪ {ID}, returns (x,DID) as answer (where DID = κH1(ID) is the
partial private key of the user whose identity is ID); while c = 1, C
aborts.
2. Otherwise, C first makes a PK(ID) query to obtain an item (ID, x, PID, c);
when c = 0, C sets L2 = L2 ∪ {ID}, returns (x,DID) as answer; while
c = 1, C aborts.
Ring-Sign Queries: AII chooses a group of n users whose identities form
the set LID = {ID1, ..., IDn} and their corresponding public keys form the
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set LPK = {P1, ..., Pn}. On receiving a Ring-Sign query RS(M,LID, LPK),
C creates a ring signature as follows:
1. Choose a random index s ∈ {1, ..., n};
2. For all i ∈ {1, ..., n}\{s}, choose ri ∈ Z
∗
q uniformly at random, com-
pute yi = g
ri .
3. For all i ∈ {1, ..., n}\{s}, set hi = H2(M ||LID||LPK ||yi).
4. Randomly choose hs ∈ Z
∗
q , V ∈ G1.
5. Compute ys = e(V−(
∑
i 6=s ri)P,P )e(
∑n
i=1 hiQi,−P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi,−U)
(Where U = H3(M || LID||LPK), Qi = H1(IDi)). If ys = 1G2 or
ys = yi for some i 6= s, then goto step 4.
6. Set H2(M ||LID||LPK ||ys) = hs.
7. Return (M,LID, LPK , σ = {(y1, ..., yn), V }) as answer.
Forgery: Finally, AII outputs a tuple (M
∗, L∗ID = {ID
∗
1 , ..., ID
∗
n}, L
∗
PK =
{P ∗1 , ..., P
∗
n}, σ
∗ = {(y∗1 , ..., y
∗
n), V
∗}) which implies that σ∗ is a ring signa-
ture on message M∗ on behalf of the group specified by identities in L∗ID
and the corresponding public keys in L∗PK . It is required that (M
∗, σ∗)
is a valid message and ring signature pair, L∗ID ∩ (L1 ∪ L2) = ∅ and C
does not know the private key of any member in the group specified by
L∗ID and L
∗
PK (Event 1). Now, Applying the ‘ring forking lemma’ [13], C
gets two valid ring signatures (M∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK , σ
∗ = {(y∗1 , ..., y
∗
n), V
∗}) and
(M∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK , σ
′∗ = {(y∗1 , ..., y
∗
n), V
′∗}). From these two ring signatures, C
obtains
e(V ∗, P ) = y∗1 · ... · y
∗
ne(
n∑
i=1
h∗iP
∗
i , U
∗)e(
n∑
i=1
h∗iQ
∗
i , P0)
and
e(V ′∗, P ) = y∗1 · ... · y
∗
ne(
n∑
i=1
h′∗i P
∗
i , U
∗)e(
n∑
i=1
h′∗i Q
∗
i , P0)
Where U∗ = H3(M
∗||L∗ID||L
∗
PK), Q
∗
i = H(ID
∗
i ), h
∗
i = H2(M
∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK , y
∗
i )
and h′∗i = H
′
2(M
∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK , y
∗
i ). The hash functions H2 and H
′
2 satisfy:
for some s ∈ {1, ..., n}, h∗s 6= h
′∗
s , while i ∈ {1, ..., n}\{s}, h
∗
i = h
′∗
i . From
the above two equations we have
e(V ∗ − V ′∗, P ) = e((h∗s − h
′∗
s )P
∗
s , U
∗)e((h∗s − h
′∗
s )Q
∗
s, P0)
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At this point, C may find the item (M∗, L∗ID, L
∗
PK , β
∗, U∗) from H3,
(ID∗s , Q
∗
s) from H1 and (ID
∗
s , x
∗
s, P
∗
s , c
∗) from K. Since U∗ = β∗aP, P ∗s =
x∗sbP , C has the following
e(V ∗ − V ′∗, P ) = e((h∗s − h
′∗
s )(x
∗
sβ
∗abP + κQ∗s), P )
This implies
V ∗ − V ′∗ = (h∗s − h
′∗
s )(x
∗
sβ
∗abP + κQ∗s)
Hence, C can obtain abP = (x∗sβ
∗)−1((h∗s − h
′∗
s )
−1(V ∗ − V ′∗)− κQ∗s).
Probability of Success: Now we determine the value of δ and consider the
probability for C to successfully solve the given CDH problem. The proba-
bility that C does not abort in all the qK Private-Key Queries is δ
qK . The
probability that AII forged a valid ring signature which C does not know any
private key of the group members’ involved in the ring signature is (1− δ)n.
So the combined probability (Pr[Event 1]) is δqK (1 − δ)n. We can find
the value of δ that maximize this probability is qK
qK+n
and the maximized
probability is ( qK
qK+n
)qK ( n
qK+n
)n.
Based on the bound from the ring forking lemma [13], if AII succeeds in
time ≤ t with probability ǫ ≥ 7P
qH1
n /2ℓ, then the CDH problem in G1 can be
solved by C within time 2(t+qH1T1+qH2T2+qH3T3+qKTPr+qPTP +qSTS)
and with probability ≥ (( qK
qK+n
)qK ( n
qK+n
)nǫ)2/66P
qH1
n .
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